(This paper has been published in the journal New Horizons: A Multidisciplinary Research Journal, Vol. XV (August 2018).
Visual Objects: Types, Forms and Status
Visual Objects: Types, Forms and Status
Rustam Singh
One should begin, perhaps, by saying that most visual
objects are not just visual objects. Many of them can also be touched, heard,
even smelled or tasted. We can touch a tree or an animal or, if we are allowed
to do so, even a sculpture or an ordinary object. We hear the people speak in a
film or a TV serial or even in a news presentation or discussion. We can smell
both living and nonliving visual objects, such as a person or a freshly printed
or old, rusty book. And we can taste fruit or bread, etc. Apart from all this,
many visual objects—a painting, a photo, a cartoon—are normally accompanied by
some text, such as a commentary, a title or a caption.
This doesn’t mean, however, that there are no purely
visual objects. I will mention only one example here, that of a photo in a
newspaper that doesn’t need a caption and speaks for itself, such as the photo
of a parched field in drought, or the photo of a crow drinking water from an
open tap.[1] In
the rest of this essay I will focus on the visual aspects of those objects that
can also have one or more non-visual aspects.
There are man-made visual objects, but there are also
forms of the visual in nature. Man-made visual objects can initially be divided
into two kinds of forms: (1) art forms, and (2) non-art forms. Non-art forms of
the visual objects can again be divided into two types: (1) forms that carry an
intellectual and emotional content, and (2) forms that do not carry such
content. For example, forms such as a cartoon, etc., do carry intellectual and
emotional content. But forms such as a bulb, a table, a toilet seat, a bottle
or a cap, etc., do not normally carry such content. It is only in exceptional
circumstances that they do so. For example, when I feel possessive about a chair
and believe that it is my chair, that chair, for me, carries an
emotional content. Similarly, when a cap, for example the Che Guevara-style of
cap, becomes a symbol of an ideology and a political movement, it does carry
intellectual and emotional content.
Art forms of the visual objects, such as a painting, a
sculpture, a photo, a film, etc., carry intellectual, emotional as also
aesthetic content. But one can also make another kind of division in the visual
objects: (1) pictorial forms, and (2) non-pictorial forms. Here, a photo, a
film, a TV serial and a video, etc., are examples of the pictorial forms; and a
sculpture, a building, theatre, a dance performance and mime, etc., are
examples of the non-pictorial forms. However, there can also be a third type of
forms in this division, ones that combine the pictorial and the non-pictorial
elements. The example one can give here is that of an installation in which the
central object is accompanied or surrounded by TV or computer screens showing
moving images.
Now, visual means that which can be seen, which is
seeable. So that when we say that a thing is visual, what we mean is that if we
wish we can see it. But what do we mean when we say that we can see an object?
Or what does seeing involve?
At first look, seeing involves three things: an object
that is seen (and what I’m calling the ‘object’ here may also be a living
being, human or nonhuman), a subject who sees, and seeing itself. But what is
seeing? What happens when I say that I am seeing?
When I see an object my visual perception encounters
the object, takes notice of it and tells me that there is an object there. But
this is not all that happens. When I see, I do not just take notice of the
object; I also figure out what object it is or what kind of object it is, what
its shape and size are, how far or near it is, whether it is static or moving,
whether it is dangerous or friendly, harmful or none of these things. If it is
an object which is pleasurable to see, I immediately notice it. If it is an
object which makes me sad or arouses fear in me, that too I take note of. I
also figure out whether after noticing the object I should stay where I am, go
close to the object or go away from it or even run away. In other words, I am
even able to figure out, at least to some extent, what action in the immediate
future I should take.
The implication here is that seeing involves not just
taking notice of an object but also understanding it or at least the attempt to
understand it, and it is not just our eyes that are active in this process but
also our mind. (I should mention here that if we simply notice an object but do
not or cannot understand it due to some reason, it would mean that ‘seeing’ has
been obstructed or the process of seeing has not been completed and therefore
seeing has not been fully accomplished.)
(What I have said above reminds me of the Hindi and
Sanskrit word ‘darshana’. ‘Darshana’ means seeing but it is a
kind of seeing that includes understanding, having an insight into things, the
phenomena. ‘Darshana’ means not just looking but also unveiling, that
is, exposing and then understanding that which is not apparently visible. That
is why this word is also used for a philosophical system or a philosophical
vision, where the system or the vision is the result of seeing. And a
philosopher is called a ‘daarshnika’, that is, the one who sees, what in
English is called a seer.[2])
This brings us to the second implication, which is
that when we are seeing we are actively and fully involved in the process, with
our entire being. This further means that there is no such thing as bare
visuality where we only notice or passively look at an object.
Now, we have been talking so far of objects as if they
were sovereign and independent and, as such, the source of all the
information that we gather about them. But not all visual objects are sovereign
and independent in this manner. Here, I’ll talk about four types of objects
which don’t seem to be sovereign and independent.
The first are what I’ll call violated visual
objects. These are those nonhuman visual objects that have been impinged upon
or encroached or invaded by humans. The visual that most readily comes to mind
here is that of the trees which are decorated with electric lights or paper
flags on various occasions and for various purposes. The second are what I’ll
call appropriated visual objects. These are those nonhuman visual
objects which have been appropriated by humans. The examples are nonhuman animals
which have been enslaved (such as buffaloes, cows, goats and sheep) or are
being raised for slaughter (such as cows, goats and sheep again, or pigs and
poultry). (Needless to say, I’m also including here those visual objects which
are raised in factory farms for the meat industry.) Nonhuman animals and
insects which have been captured and are kept alive for experimental purposes
fall in the same category. Other examples are animals in zoos and birds in
cages.[3]
The third and the fourth categories of the visual
objects which are not sovereign and independent include those objects which are
created and used as a medium. And I’m talking here of visual objects that are man-made,
that are produced by humans. As such, they are not to be found in nature, but
only in settings which are created by humans and can be called human-dominated settings. To make things
more clear, I should say that these objects include all those art and non-art
forms of the visual objects which are made by humans.
But there are some differences between the objects
included in these two latter categories. In the third category, what I will
call mediated visual objects, I will place those visual objects whose
purpose is not mere entertainment. The examples here are art objects, such as a
photo, a painting, a sculpture, certain kinds of films—what are called art or documentary films—and a theatre or dance performance. We can also
include here cave paintings and objects known as craft such as items made from
clay, wood and metals, etc. Cartoons making socio-political commentary, too,
can be included here as examples. Finally, in the fourth category, what I will
call mediatized visual objects, I will place those visual objects which
are meant to provide pure entertainment. The examples here are popular kind of
films, soap TV serials, reality TV and even delivery and analysis of news on TV
channels when these are turned into a performance.
In the case of the visual objects in all these four categories
there is not just a viewer and a visual object; rather, there is another entity
residing somewhere behind the object but at the same time present within it,
and when we see the object, this entity is not always explicitly visible: it is
like a presence that we cannot see but is always there. In the case of the
objects in the first two categories, namely the violated and the appropriated
visual objects, the identity of this presence is quite clear: it consists of
those humans who impinge upon or enslave the objects. In the case of the third
and the fourth categories, namely the mediated and the mediatized
visual objects, this presence is the person or the people who create a visual
object or phenomenon and use it as a medium. And I need to add here that this
person or these people need not necessarily be alive; it is possible that they
created this object and are now long dead. Further, normally makers of these
objects can be named; but I’m including here also the objects whose makers are
unknown and hence cannot be named, they are anonymous.
However, in all such cases, the presence that we are
talking about, that is, the entity behind the object and also within it, becomes the dominant source from where the information
flows and reaches the viewer through the visual object.
Therefore, it seems to me that visual objects that
belong to these four categories, mentioned above, are not complete
visual objects but are rather incomplete in the sense that in order to
see them in their totality we need to be aware of this third entity which is
behind them and also within them like a presence but is not explicitly visible.
And in the case of the visual objects in the first two
categories—the violated and the appropriated visual objects—we
need to add that, in addition to being incomplete, they are also damaged
visual objects. They are impinged upon or invaded or enslaved and are not fully
in possession of their being. Part of their being, and as such their destiny,
is in the possession of someone else.
Here, I would like to introduce another element in this
discussion: when we see an object in the manner in which seeing has been
described above, it is as if the object begins to speak to us, and what it
tells us and what we hear is a part of seeing, or, we can even say that it is
part of its visuality. The object begins to tell us about itself, about what it
is, and about its destiny or situation. For example, when we see a pig in a
factory farm, in the small space where it is confined (and the same is true of
all the other animals in the factory farms), it is as if without speaking in
the human voice it tells us about the painful life it is forced live and that
it will be sent to the slaughterhouse when it is fat enough and therefore doesn’t
have long to live. Animals which are targets of experiments in laboratories
tell us that their life is perhaps even more painful than animals in the
factory farms. A parrot in a cage, too, tells us a story, the essence of which
is that it is exists for the entertainment or the emotional or rather
sentimental tickling of the people who have enslaved it. An elephant on a
crowded and noisy city road being made to participate in a religious festival
tells us that it has been uprooted from its habitat and is being forced to live
a life which is alien to it. A tree decorated with lights and other sundry
stuff tells us that it is being forced to serve a purpose for which it was not
made.
Mediated and mediatized forms of the visual objects, too, speak to us but
in a somewhat different fashion. The voice of the mediated objects, when they speak to us, is quieter than the voice
of the violated and appropriated visual objects. There is
less tremor in it, if at all, and there is less pathos. However, the voice of
the mediatized objects is the
loudest, even when it sounds quiet, even when it sounds like a whisper. This is
so because their aim is not really to talk to us but rather to shout us down or
to shut us up. That is why the being of the mediatized
visual objects is much coarser or cruder as compared to the being of almost all
the other objects mentioned above.
Towards the end, I would like to come back to what I
have called the violated and appropriated visual objects. The
examples I gave of such objects earlier were all of them of living objects.
This gives the impression that the violated forms of the visual objects,
as also those of the appropriated objects, can only be the living
objects. But this need not necessarily be the case. Even the nonliving visual
objects can be violated and appropriated. For example, a painting can be
violated, a sculpture or a statue can be violated, and may stay in that
condition at least for some time. However, in such cases we call it a violation
because of the value we, the humans, place on them. But a graver violation is
that in which the object is not a product of the humans and thus has a sovereign
being, independent of the humans.
Among the living visual objects the examples of a sovereign
being are a tree, a bird, an animal or an insect in its natural habitat.
Among the nonliving visual objects the examples of a sovereign being are, let
us say, a river, a mountain, a rock or a stone, before they have
been violated or appropriated.
In other words, when dams are built on a river, when
it is forced to change its course or when it is heavily polluted by man-made
objects and chemicals, it is no longer sovereign. When trees and shrubs on a
mountain are cleared away and it is loaded with man-made ugly objects, such as
modern buildings, or when chunks of its body are blasted off to make holes
through it or for mining purposes, it is no longer sovereign. When we sit on a
rock and stare down into a valley, its sovereignty is not violated. When we use
stones to build a small hut in their natural habitat, I don’t think their
sovereignty is violated. But when rocks and stones are cut into pieces and are taken
hundreds or thousands of miles away to become part of a structure in an alien
environment, they are no longer sovereign and have been violated and
appropriated.
Finally, it is necessary to say that when we no longer
see things or objects in their sovereign state and become used to seeing them only
in their violated, appropriated or damaged form, it means that our visual
perception, our own ability to see, too, has been damaged, if not violated. This
damage to or violation of our visual perception in turn means that our being
itself has been damaged or violated. And henceforth we move around carrying a damaged
or violated being, even if we may not be aware of this.
[1] We
are saying this despite what W. J. T. Mitchell, in his paper “There Are No
Visual Media”, had argued. According to him, there are only mixed media,
therefore no purely visual media. Clearly, we don’t agree with Mitchell. See,
Journal of Visual Culture, August 2005, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 257-66.
Veu.sagepub.com/content/4/2/257.full.pdf+html
Accessed on 16 March 2016.
[2] Monier
Monier-Williams, in his A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, mentions, among
others, the following meanings of the word ‘darshana’: seeing, observing,
inspection, examination, experiencing, contemplating, apprehension,
understanding, foreseeing, philosophical system, a vision, etc. See, A
Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private
Limited, Delhi, 2002.
[3] Properly
speaking, this kind of visual objects are not just objects; they are also, at
least partly, subjects. However, in this paper we will continue to call them
objects.
Works Cited
Mitchell, W.J.T. (2005)
‘There Are No Visual Media,’ Journal of Visual Culture, 4(2). Available
at: Veu.sagepub.com/content/4/2/257.full.pdf+html [16 March 2016], 257-66.
Monier-Williams, M. (2002) A
Sanskrit-English Dictionary. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers
Private Limited.
